The Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden Ownersh
Location: Amsterdam Hilton Hotel, Amsterdam
Arguably, the rise of shareholder activism by hedge funds has served to transform corporate governance on both sides of the Atlantic. Activist hedge typically achieve their goals by using a wide range of techniques, including decoupling voting rights from economic ownership of shares. Such decoupling allows investors to hold more votes than economic ownership or, in some cases, foster hidden ownership.
The ACCF has invited Professor Henry Hu, who is the world's leading academic expert on shareholder voting and hedge funds, to deliver a lecture at the lunch time seminar. He will examine the persistence of decoupling of voting rights from economic ownership, and propose a framework to evaluate the economic benefits and costs of the 'new vote buying'. He holds the Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance at the university of Texas School of Law in Austin, Texas. He is also a member of the American Law Institute.
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